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Abstract—This paper studies resilient distributed estimation
under measurement attacks. A set of agents each makes succes-
sive local, linear, noisy measurements of an unknown vector field
collected in a vector parameter. The local measurement models
are heterogeneous across agents and may be locally unobservable
for the unknown parameter. An adversary compromises some of
the measurement streams and changes their values arbitrarily.
The agents’ goal is to cooperate over a peer-to-peer commu-
nication network to process their (possibly compromised) local
measurements and estimate the value of the unknown vector
parameter. We present SAGE, the Saturating Adaptive Gain Es-
timator, a distributed, recursive, consensus+innovations estimator
that is resilient to measurement attacks. We demonstrate that,
as long as the number of compromised measurement streams is
below a particular bound, then, SAGE guarantees that all of the
agents’ local estimates converge almost surely to the value of the
parameter. The resilience of the estimator – i.e., the number
of compromised measurement streams it can tolerate – does
not depend on the topology of the inter-agent communication
network. Finally, we illustrate the performance of SAGE through
numerical examples.
Index Terms—Resilient estimation, Distributed estimation,
Consensus + Innovations, Multi-agent networks
I. INTRODUCTION
The continued growth of the Internet of Things (IoT)
has introduced numerous applications featuring networks of
devices cooperating toward a common objective. IoT devices
instrument smart cities to monitor traffic patterns or air pol-
lution [1], convoys of driverless cars cooperate to navigate
through hazardous weather conditions [2], [3], and teams of
reconnaisance drones form ad-hoc networks to extend their
coverage areas [4]. These applications require distributed al-
gorithms to locally process measurements collected at each in-
dividual device for actionable insight. For example, connected
autonomous vehicles need to estimate the global state of traffic
from their local sensor measurements for safe and efficient
path planning, without transmitting their raw measured data
to the cloud.
IoT devices, however, are vulnerable to malicious cyber
attacks, and, in particular, adversaries may pathologically
corrupt a subset of the devices’ (or agents’) measurements [5].
Attackers may create false traffic obstacles for a driverless car
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by spoofing its LIDAR [6], or they may arbitrarily control
vehicles by manipulating its onboard sensor measurements [7],
[8]. In IoT setups, attacks on individual devices propagate over
the network and affect the behavior of other devices [5], [9]–
[11]. Without proper countermeasures, IoT will be compro-
mised with possibly dangerous consequences.
In this paper, we address the following question: how can
an IoT or network of agents resiliently estimate an unknown
(vector) parameter while an adversary manipulates a subset
of their measurements? Consider a set of agents or devices,
connected by a communication network of arbitrary topology,
each making a stream of measurements of an unknown param-
eter θ∗. For example, in air quality monitoring applications,
θ∗ represents the field of pollutant concentrations throughout
a city, and each device makes successive measurements of a
few components of the parameter, corresponding to pollutant
concentrations in specific locations. An adversary manipulates
a subset of the local measurement streams. The agents’ goal
is to ensure that all agents resiliently estimate the field
or (vector) parameter θ∗. This paper presents SAGE, the
Saturating Adaptive Gain Estimator, a recursive distributed
estimator, that guarantees that, under a sufficient condition on
the number of compromised measurement streams, all of the
agents’ local estimates are (statistically) strongly consistent,
i.e., they converge to θ∗ almost surely (a.s.).
A. Literature Review
We briefly review related literature, and we start with the
Byzantine Generals problem, which demonstrates the effect of
adversaries in distributed computation [12]. In this problem,
a group of agents must decide whether or not to attack an
enemy city by passing messages to each other over an all-
to-all communication network. A subset of adversarial agents
transmits malicious messages to prevent the remaining agents
from reaching the correct decision. Reference [12] shows that a
necessary and sufficient condition for any distributed protocol
to recover the correct decision is that less than one third of
the agents be adversarial. Like [12], reference [13] also studies
resilient consensus (i.e., reaching agreement among the agents)
over all-to-all communication networks. Unlike the consensus
problem, which does not incorporate measurements, we study,
in this paper, resilient distributed estimation, where agents
must process their local measurement streams.
Byzantine attacks also affect performance of decentralized
inference algorithms. In decentralized inference, a team of
devices measures an unknown parameter and transmits either
their measurements or their local decisions to a fusion center,
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2which then processes all data simultaneously to recover the
value of the parameter. Adversarial (Byzantine) devices trans-
mit falsified data to the fusion center to disrupt the inference
process. References [14] and [15] address hypothesis testing
under Byzantine attack (where the parameter may only take
discrete values), and references [16] and [17] address estima-
tion (where the parameter may take continuous values). The
work on resilient decentralized inference in [14]–[17] restrict
the adversary to follow probabilistic attack strategies and use
this restriction to design resilient processing algorithms. In this
paper, we consider a stronger class of adversaries who may
behave arbitrarily, unlike the restricted adversaries from [14]–
[17] who must adhere to probabilistic strategies.
While [12] and [13] study resilient computation over fully-
connected, all-to-all networks, in general, distributed compu-
tation in IoT involves sparse communications, where each
device only communicates with a small subset of the other
devices. The authors of [18] propose an algorithm for resilient
Byzantine consensus of local agent states over sparse com-
munication networks that guarantees that the non-adversarial
agents resiliently reach consensus in the presence of Byzantine
adversaries as long as the graph satisfies conditions that restrict
topology of the communication network. Reference [19] ex-
tends the algorithm in [18] to address distributed estimation.
The estimator in [19] is resilient to Byzantine agents (i.e.,
all nonadversarial agents resiliently estimate the unknown
parameter) but requires that a known subset of the agents be
guaranteed, a priori, to be nonadversarial. In this paper, we do
not assume that any agent is impervious to adversaries; any
subset of the agents may fall under attack.
A popular method to cope with Byzantine agents is to
deploy algorithms that explicitly detect and identify adver-
saries [11], [20]–[22]. Reference [20] studies multi-task dis-
tributed estimation, where, instead of estimating a single
parameter, the agents may be interested in estimating different
parameters. The authors of [20] propose a distributed algo-
rithm for each agent to identify the neighbors that are inter-
ested in estimating the same parameter and ignore information
from neighbors that are interested in estimating different
parameters. If all adversaries behave as though they measure a
different parameter, then, the algorithm from [20] successfully
identifies them. Byzantine agents in general, however, are
not required to behave as though they measure and estimate
a different parameter; they may send arbitrary information
to their neighbors. The algorithm from [20] is only able to
identify one type of Byzantine behavior (i.e., where byzantine
agents behave as though they measure a different parameter)
but not all Byzantine behaviors in general.
The authors of [21] develop distributed algorithms to detect
and identify adversarial agents. In [21], each device must
know the structure of the entire network and the consensus
algorithm dynamics (i.e., how each agent updates their local
state), which is then leveraged to design attack detection
and identification filters. In general, attack identification is
computationally expensive. Even in centralized settings, where
a fusion center has access to all of the agents’ measurements,
identifying attacks is a combinatorial problem (in the number
of measurements) [23]–[25]. Reference [22] also requires
each agent to know the topology of the entire network, and
it designs algorithms to detect and identify adversaries in
distributed function calculation. The techniques from [21]
and [22] become burdensome in terms of memory, commu-
nication, and computation requirements as the number of
agents and the size of the network grows. To avoid this
high computational cost, we develop a resilient distributed
estimator that does not depend on expliclitly detecting nor
on identifying the attack. We emphasize that not requiring the
explicit detection and identification of compromised streams is
a feature, not a limitation, of our approach that is very useful
in many practical scenarios.
In our previous work [11], we designed a method to
detect the presence of adversaries in distributed estimation
that applies to general communication network topologies and
only requires each agent to know who its local neighbors are.
Our algorithm guaranteed that, in the presence of adversaries,
the uncompromised agents will either almost surely recover
the value of the unknown parameter or detect the presence of
Byzantine agents. Unlike [11], this paper presents a distributed
estimation algorithm that copes with attacks on measurement
streams without explicitly detecting the attack. The estimator
in this paper ensures that all of the agents, not just the
uncompromised agents (like in [11]), resiliently recover the
value of the unknown parameter.
Instead of explicitly detecting and identifying attacks as
in [11], [21], [22], other methods cope with adversaries
implicitly. Implicit countermeasures aim to ensure that the
agents achieve their collective objective (e.g., in distributed
estimation, the agents’ objective is to recover the value of the
unknown parameter) without explicitly detecting and identify-
ing the adversary’s actions. References [10], [26] present dis-
tributed diffusion algorithms for multi-task estimation, where,
like in [20], the agents measure and are interested in estimating
different parameters. In [10] and [26], to cope with neighbors
who are interested in estimating different parameters, each
agent applies adaptive weights to data received from their
neighbors. Over time, the agents learn to ignore informa-
tion that is irrelevant to their estimation tasks. Multi-task
distributed estimation algorithms [10], [26] may cope with
adversaries who behave as though they measure a different
parameter but fail to cope with Byzantine agents in general.
Reference [27] shows how a single Byzantine agent may
prevent distributed diffusion algorithms ( [10], [20], [26]) from
correctly estimating the unknown parameter.
Our previous work [5] presented an algorithm for distributed
parameter recovery that we demonstrate analytically to be
implicitly resilient against measurement attacks (i.e., attacks
that manipulate the agents’ local measurement streams). In [5],
each agent’s measurement was noiseless and homogeneous.
That is, in the absence of attacks, every agent had the
same, noiseless measurement model. This paper, unlike [5],
addresses agents with possibly different or heterogeneous
measurement models that are corrupted by noise. A survey and
overview of both explicit and implicit security countermea-
sures for resilient computation in decentralized and distributed
IoT architectures is found in our previous work [9].
3B. Summary of Contributions
This paper studies resilient distributed estimation under
measurement attacks. A team of IoT devices (or agents) makes
noisy, heterogeneous measurements of an unknown, static
parameter θ∗. The devices share information with their neigh-
bors over a communication network and process locally their
measurement streams to estimate θ∗. An adversary attacks
some of the measurements – a compromised measurement
takes arbitrary value as determined by the adversary. Our goal
is to ensure that all of the agents, even those with compro-
mised measurements, consistently estimate θ∗. To this end, we
present SAGE, the Saturating Adaptive Gain Estimator.
SAGE is a consensus+innovations type estimator where
each agent maintains and updates its estimate as a weighted
sum of its current estimate, its current measurement, and the
estimates of its neighbors (see, e.g., [28]–[31]). Each agent
applies an adaptive gain to its measurement in the estimate
update procedure to limit the impact of aberrant, compromised
measurements. We design this gain and establish a sufficient
condition on the maximum number of measurement streams
that may be compromised, under which SAGE guarantees
that all of the agents resiliently estimate the parameter of
interest. Specifically, as long as the sufficient condition is
satisfied, then, SAGE ensures that all of the agents’ estimates
are strongly consistent, i.e., the estimate of each (local) agent
converges almost surely to the value of the parameter. We will
compare this sufficient condition against theoretical bounds
of resilience established for centralized (or cloud) estimators,
where a single processor has access to all of the measure-
ments [23]–[25].
Although SAGE shares similar ideas with the Saturated
Innovations Update (SIU) algorithm from [5], a resilient
distributed parameter recovery algorithm for setups where the
agents all make the same (homogeneous), noiseless measure-
ment of the parameter θ∗, SAGE addresses resilient distributed
estimation when 1) the agents make different (heterogeneous)
measurements and 2) the measurements are corrupted by
measurement noise. The first extension allows for agents or
sensors of different types to cooperate, a more realistic and
practical condition. The second makes the analysis of SAGE
much more intricate than the analysis of SIU.
With measurement noise, it is more difficult to distinguish
compromised measurements from normal measurements, since
a strategic adversary may hide the effect of the measurement
attacks within the noise. So, SAGE and the agents must
simultaneously cope with the natural disturbance from the
noise as well as the artificial disturbance from the attack.
With SIU and noiseless settings [5], the agents only have to
deal with disturbances resulting from the attack. The analysis
of SAGE requires new technical tools, that we develop in
this paper, not found in [5], to deal with the measurement
noise. Compared to the literature (notably [5], [28]–[31]), the
improvements of SAGE are 1) heterogeneous measurement
models and measurement noise with respect to [5] and 2) the
presence of attacks with respect to [28]–[31].
This paper focuses on measurement attacks, where an ad-
versary manipulates the values of a subset of the agents’ mea-
surement streams, in contrast with Byzantine attacks where
adversarial agents send false information to their neighbors. To
cope with Byzantine agents, the uncompromised agents must
additionally filter and process the information they receive
from neighbors [10], [11], [18], [19], [21], [22]. In contrast,
to cope with measurement attacks, agents must additionally
filter and process their own measurement streams. Existing
algorithms for resilient distributed computation with Byzantine
agents (e.g., [10], [11], [18], [19], [21], [22]) only ensure
that the uncompromised agents resiliently complete the task.
Moreover, algorithms from [18], [19], [22] constrain the
topology of the communication network to satisfy specific
conditions (e.g., in [22], on the number of unique paths
between any two uncompromised agents). In contrast, we
will show here that SAGE is resilient to measurement attacks
regardless of the network topology, as long as it is connected
on average, and we ensure that all of the agents, including
those with compromised measurements, consistently estimate
the unknown parameter.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we review the models for the measurements, communications,
and attacks. Section III presents the SAGE algorithm, a con-
sensus+innovations estimator that is resilient to measurement
attacks. In Section IV, we show that, as long as a sufficient
condition on the number of compromised agents is satisfied,
then, for any connected network topology, SAGE guarantees
that all of the agents’ local estimates are strongly consistent.
Section V compares the sufficient condition (on the number
of compromised agents for resilient distributed estimation)
against theroetical resilience bounds for centralized (cloud)
estimators. We illustrate the performance of SAGE through
numerical examples in Section VI, and we conclude in Sec-
tion VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Notation
Let Rk be the k dimensional Euclidean space, Ik the k
by k identity matrix, 1k and 0k the k dimensional one and
zero vectors. The operator ‖·‖2 is the `2 norm. For matrices
A and B, A ⊗ B is the Kronecker product. A set of vectors
V = {v1, . . . , v|V|} is orthogonal if vᵀi vj = 0 for all i 6= j.
Let G = (V,E) be a simple undirected graph (no self loops
or multiple edges) with vertices V = {1, . . . , N} and edges E.
The neighborhood of vertex n, Ωn, is the set of vertices that
share an edge with n. The degree of a node dn is the size of
its neighborhood |Ωn|, and the degree matrix of the graph G
is D = diag(d1, . . . , dN ). The adjacency matrix of G is A =
[Anl], where Anl = 1 if (n, l) ∈ E and Anl = 0 otherwise.
The Laplacian matrix of G is L = D − A. The Laplacian
matrix L has ordered eigenvalues 0 = λ1(L) ≤ · · · ≤ λN (L),
and eigenvector 1N associated with the eigenvalue λ1(L) = 0.
For a connected graph G, λ2(L) > 0. We assume that G is
connected in the sequel. References [32], [33] review spectral
graph theory.
Random objects are defined on a common probability space
(Ω,F) equipped with a filtration {Ft}. Reference [34] reviews
stochastic processes and filtrations. Let P (·) and E (·) be the
4probability and expectation operators, respectively. In this pa-
per, unless otherwise stated, all inequalities involving random
variables hold almost surely (a.s.), i.e., with probability 1.
B. Measurement and Communication Model
Consider a set of N agents or devices {1, 2, . . . , N}, each
making noisy, local streams of measurements of an unknown
field represented by a vector parameter θ∗ ∈ RM . For example,
a network of air quality sensors may monitor several pollutant
concentrations over a city. The measurement of agent n at time
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . is
yn(t) = Hnθ
∗ + wn(t), (1)
where wn(t) is the local measurement noise. Agent n has
Pn scalar measurements (at each time t), and M is the
dimension of the parameter θ∗ (i.e., Hn ∈ RPn×M ).1 In air
quality monitoring, for example, each device may measure the
concentrations of a few pollutants in its neighborhood over
time, corresponding to specific components of θ∗.
Assumption 1. The measurement noise wn(t) is indepen-
dently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time and inde-
pendent across agents with mean E [wn(t)] = 0 and covariance
E [wn(t)wn(t)ᵀ] = Σn. The sequence {wn(t)} is Ft+1
adapted and independent of Ft.
The agents’ estimation performance depends on the collec-
tion of all of their local measurements. Let
yt =
[
yᵀ1 (t) · · · yᵀN (t)
]ᵀ
= Hθ∗ +wt, (2)
be stack of all agents’ measurements at time t, where
wt =
[
wᵀ1 (t) · · · wᵀN (t)
]ᵀ
,
H = [ Hᵀ1 · · · HᵀN ]ᵀ
collect the measurement noises and measurement matrices
(H1, . . . ,HN ), respectively. Let P =
∑N
n=1 Pn be the total
number of (scalar) measurements (at each time t) over all
agents (i.e., the matrix H has P rows). We index the scalar
components of yt from 1 to P ,
yt =

y(1)(t)
...
y(P1)(t)
 y1(t)
...
y(Pn+1)(t)
...
y(Pn+Pn)(t)
 yn(t)
...
y(PN+1)(t)
...
y(P )(t)
 yN (t)

, (3)
1Our measurement model differes from the model used in [5], where each
agent made the same, noiseless measurement yn(t) = θ∗.
where Pn =
∑n−1
j=0 Pj . In general, Pn+1, . . . , Pn+Pn index
the components of yn(t). Similar to (3), we label the rows of
H as hᵀ1 , . . . , hᵀP (hᵀp ∈ R1×M ), i.e.,
H = [ h1 · · · hP ]ᵀ ,
and, in general, Pn + 1, . . . , Pn +Pn, index the rows of Hn.
Assumption 2. The measurement vectors hp are normalized
to unit `2 norm, i.e., ‖hp‖2 = 1,∀p = 1, . . . P .
We make Assumption 2 without loss of generality. If Assump-
tion 2 is not satisfied, each agent may compute a normalized
version of its local measurement
Dyn(t) = DHnθ∗ +Dwn(t),
where
D = diag
(∥∥hPn+1∥∥−12 , . . . ,∥∥hPn+Pn∥∥−12 ) .
Then, instead of processing the raw measurements yn(t), the
agents may process the normalized measurements Dyn(t).
Note that each row of the matrix DHn (i.e., the measurement
matrix associated with the normalized measurement Dyn(t))
satisfies Assumption 2.
We now define a measurement stream.
Definition 1 (Measurement Stream). A measurement stream{
y(p)(t)
}
t=0,1,2,...
is the collection of the scalar measurement
y(p)(t) over all times t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . .
For the rest of this paper, we refer to measurement streams
by their component index, i.e., measurement stream p refers
to
{
y(p)(t)
}
t=0,1,2,...
. Let P = {1, . . . , P} be the set of all
measurement streams.
The agents’ collective goal is to estimate the value of θ∗
using their local measurement streams. Global observabilty is
an important property for estimation.
Definition 2 (Global Observability). Let X ={
p1, . . . , p|X |
} ⊆ P be a collection of measurement
stream indices. Consider the measurement vectors associated
with the streams in X , collected in the stacked measurement
matrix
HX =
[
hp1 · · · hp|X|
]ᵀ
.
The set X is globally observable if the observability Grammian
GX = HᵀXHX =
∑
p∈X
hph
ᵀ
p (4)
is invertible. .
Global observabilty of a set of measurement streams X , means
that, in the absence of noise wn(t), the value of θ∗ may be
determined exactly from a single snapshot (in time) of the
measurements in X . When the parameter θ∗ and measure-
ment vectors hp are static, then, having access to streams of
measurements over time does not affect observability.
Assumption 3. The set of all measurement streams P is glob-
ally observable: the matrix GP =
∑P
p=1 hph
ᵀ
p is invertible.
2
2Global observability is necessary for centralized estimators to be consis-
tent, so, it is natural to also assume it here for distributed settings.
5In contrast with [5], here, the measurements at each individual
agent are not observable, i.e., we do not require local observ-
ability, and an individual agent may not consistently estimate
θ∗ using just its own local measurements.
Agents may exchange information with each other over
a time-varying communication network, defined by a time
varying graph G(t) = (V,E(t)). In the graph G(t), the vertex
set V is the set of all agents {1, 2, . . . , N}, and the edge
set E(t) is the set of communication links between agents
at time t.
Assumption 4. The Laplacians {L(t)} (associated with the
graphs {G(t)}) form an i.i.d. sequence with mean E [L(t)] =
L. The sequence {L(t)} is Ft+1 adapted and independent
of Ft. The sequences {L(t)} and {wn(t)} are mutually
independent.
The random graphs G(t) (and associated Laplacians L(t)) cap-
ture communication link failures, like intermittent shadowing
common in wireless environments, as well as random gossip
communication protocols [30]. For example, in the absence
of link failures, the communication network may be a fixed
graph G = (V,E). In practice, however, some of these links
may fail intermitently, inducing a random, time varying graph
G(t) = (V,E(t)).
The agents’ collective goal is to estimate the value of
the parameter θ∗ (in context of air quality monitoring, the
concentration of pollutants) using their measurements and
information received from their neighbors.
Assumption 5. The communication network is connected on
average. That is, we require λ2
(
L
)
> 0. We do not require
G(t) to be connected.
C. Attack Model
An attacker attempts to disrupt the agents and prevent them
from estimating θ∗. The attacker replaces a subset of the
measurements with arbitrary values. We model the effect of the
attack as an additive disturbance an(t), so that, under attack,
the measurement of agent n is
yn(t) = Hnθ
∗ + wn(t) + an(t). (5)
Similar to yn(t) and Hn, we label the components
of an(t) by Pn + 1, . . . , Pn + Pn, i.e., an(t) =[
a(Pn+1)(t) · · · a(Pn+Pn)(t)
]ᵀ
. We say that measure-
ment stream p is compromised or under attack if, for any
t = 0, 1, . . . , a(p)(t) 6= 0.3 We make no assumptions about
how the attacker compromises the measurement streams. The
attacker may choose an(t) arbitrarily, which, in general, may
be unbounded and time varying. For example, in air quality
monitoring, if measurement stream p is compromised, then,
at some time t, instead of taking the value of the true
pollutant concentration, y(p)(t) becomes an arbitrarily valued
concentration measurement. For analysis, we partition P , the
3A compromised measurement stream does not have to be under attack for
all times t. If there is any t such that a(p)(t) 6= 0, we consider p to be
compromised even if there exists t′ 6= t such that a(p)(t) = 0.
set of all measurement streams, into the set of compromised
measurement streams
A =
{
p ∈ P
∣∣∣∃t = 0, 1, . . . , a(p)(t) 6= 0} , (6)
and the set of noncompromised or uncompromised measure-
ment streams N = P \A. Each agent n may have both com-
promised and uncompromised local measurement streams: if
one of agent n’s measurement streams is compromised, it does
not necessarily mean that all of its streams are compromised.
The sets A and N are time invariant. Agents do not know
which measurement streams are compromised.
When measurements fall under attack, resilient estimation
of θ∗ depends on the notion of (global) s-sparse observabilty.
Definition 3 (Global s-Sparse Observabilty ( [24], [25])). Let
P be the set of all measurement streams. The set of all
measurement streams is globally s-sparse observable if the
matrix
GP\X = HᵀP\XHP\X =
∑
p∈P\X
hph
ᵀ
p .
is invertible for all subsets X ⊆ P of cardinality |X | = s. .
A set of measurements is (globally) s-sparse observable if it is
still (globally) observable after removing any s measurements
from the set [24], [25].
We make the following assumptions on the attacker:
Assumption 6. The attacker may only manipulate a subset of
the measurement streams. That is, 0 ≤ |A|P < 1. The attacker
may not manipulate all of the measurement streams.
Assumption 7. The attack does not change the value of
θ∗. That is the attacker may only manipulate the agents’
measurements of θ∗, but it may not change the true value
of θ∗. In the context of air quality monitoring, this means
that the attacker may change some of the measurements of
the pollutant concentrations, but may not change the true
concentrations themselves.
The attack model in this paper differs from the Byzantine
attack model (see, e.g., [11], [12], [14], [18], [19], [35]).
Under the Byzantine attack model, a subset of adversarial
agents behaves arbitrarily and transmits false information to
their neighbors, while the remaining nonadversarial agents
must cope with pathologically corrupted data received from
their adversarial neighbors. In contrast, under the measurement
attack model (5), agents do not intentionally transmit false
information to their neighbors. Instead, agents must cope with
adversarial data from a subset of their measurement streams.
Resilient algorithms for the Byzantine attacker model aim to
ensure that only the non-adversarial, uncompromised agents
accomplish their computation task [11], [18], [19]. This is
because Byzantine agents may behave arbitrarily and deviate
from any prescribed protocol. For distributed estimation under
the measurement attack model (equation (5) with Assump-
tions 6 and 7), we aim to ensure that all agents recover
the value of the unknown parameter, even those agents with
compromised measurement streams.
Byzantine attacks compromise the communication between
agents. Attackers may intercept communication packets and
6change their contents, or they may, via malicious software,
force agents to transmit false information to neighbors [36].
The measurement attack model in SAGE considers attacks that
compromise the data collected by the agents. Attackers spoof
the agents’ measurements so that they collect false data. For
example, attackers may create false obstacles for a driverless
car by feeding it false LIDAR measurements [6].
III. SAGE: SATURATING ADAPTIVE GAIN ESTIMATOR
In this section, we present SAGE, the Saturating Adap-
tive Gain Estimator, a distributed estimation algorithm that
is resilient to measurement attacks. SAGE is a consensus
+ innovations distributed estimator [28]–[31] and is based
on the Saturated Innovations Update (SIU) algorithm we
introduced [5]. Unlike the SIU algorithm, which requires the
agents’ measurement streams to be noiseless (i.e., wn(t) ≡ 0
in (1) and (5)) and homogeneous (Hn ≡ IM ), SAGE may
simultaneously cope with disturbances from both measurement
noise and the attacker on heterogeneous (possibly different
Hn) linear measurement models.
A. Algorithm Description
SAGE is an iterative algorithm in which each agent main-
tains and updates a local estimate xn(t) based on its local
observation yn(t) and the information it receives from its
neighbors. Each iteration of SAGE consists of a message
passing step and an estimate update step. Each agent n sets
its initial local estimate as xn(0) = 0.
Message Passing: Every agent n transmits its current esti-
mate, xn(t), to each of its neighbors l ∈ Ωn.
Estimate Update: Every agent n maintains a running aver-
age of its local measurement stream; i.e., each agent computes
yn(t) =
t
t+ 1
yn(t− 1) +
1
t+ 1
yn(t), (7)
with initial condition yn(−1) = 0. Note that, if p is not under
attack (i.e., p ∈ N ), then,
y(p)(t) = hᵀpθ
∗ + w(p)(t),
where w(p)n (t) = 1t+1
∑t
j=0 w
(p)
n (j) is time-averaged measure-
ment noise. Every agent n updates its estimate as
xn(t+ 1) =xn(t)− βt
∑
l∈Ωn(t)
(xn(t)− xl(t))
+ αtH
ᵀ
nKn(t) (yn(t)−Hnxn(t)) ,
(8)
where αt > 0 and βt > 0 are weight sequences to be
defined in the sequel. The term yn(t)−Hnxn(t) is innovation
of agent n. The innovation term is the difference between
the agent’s observed (averaged) measurement yn(t) and its
predicted measurement Hnxn(t), based on its current esti-
mate xn(t) and the measurement model (1). The innovation
term incorporates information from the agent’s measurement
streams into its updated estimate. The second term in (8) is
the global consensus average.
The term Kn(t) is a diagonal matrix of gains that depends
on the innovation yn(t)−Hnxn(t) and is defined as
Kn(t) = diag
(
kPn+1(t), . . . kPn+Pn(t)
)
, (9)
where, for p = Pn + 1, . . . , Pn + Pn,
kp(t) = min
(
1, γt
∣∣∣y(p)n (t)− hᵀpxn(t)∣∣∣−1) , (10)
and γt is a scalar adaptive threshold to be defined in the
sequel. The gain kp(t) saturates the innovation term, along
each component, at the threshold γt. That is, kp(t) ensures
that, for each measurement stream p, the magnitude of the
scaled innovation,
∣∣∣kp(t)(y(p)n (t)− hᵀpxn(t))∣∣∣, never exceeds
the threshold γt.
The purpose of Kn(t) and γt is to limit the impact of
attacks. It may, however, also limit the impact of measure-
ments that are not under attack (p ∈ N ). The main challenge
in designing the SAGE algorithm is to choose the adaptive
threshold γt to balance these two effects. We choose γt and
the weight sequences αt and βt as follows:
1) Select αt, βt as:
αt =
a
(t+ 1)τ1
, βt =
b
(t+ 1)τ2
, (11)
with a, b > 0 and 0 < τ2 < τ1 < 1.
2) Select γt as:
γt =
Γ
(t+ 1)τγ
, (12)
with Γ > 0 and 0 < τγ < min
(
1
2 , τ1 − τ2
)
.
Choosing αt, βt, and γt correctly is key to the resilience and
consistency of SAGE. If we choose these weight sequences
incorrectly, then, SAGE is not resilient to the measurement
attacks. We carefully craft αt and βt to decay over time, with
αt decaying faster than βt. In the long run, the consensus
term dominates the innovation term. The difference in decay
rates results in the mixed time-scale behavior of the estimate
update (8), which is crucial for consistency [28]–[31]. The
threshold γt also decays over time. Initially, the estimate
update (8), with large contributions from the innovation terms,
incorporates more information from the measurements. After
several updates, as local estimates xn(t) become closer to
the true value of the parameter, we expect the innovation
to decrease in magnitude for uncompromised measurements.
By reducing the threshold γt over time, we limit the impact
of compromised measurements without overly affecting the
contribution from the noncompromised measurements.
Compared with SIU [5], SAGE uses the same innovation
and consensus weights αt and βt (11) but uses a different
threshold sequence γt (12). In [5], which considered homo-
geneous measurements without noise, we designed threshold
γt to be an upper bound on the magnitude of the innovation
term for noncompromised measurements. That is, in [5], if
measurement stream p is not under attack, then, the innovation
component associated with p is guaranteed to have magnitude
less than γt. When there is (unbounded) measurement noise,
it is impossible to construct a threshold sequence with this
property: even if measurement stream p is not under attack,
the noise may cause the innovation magnitude to exceed the
threshold. So, instead of using the threshold sequence from [5],
we use a new threshold sequence (12), which is more suitable
for the noisy setting. Further, in SAGE, because the local
7measurements are heterogeneous, they can also, and will in
general be, unobservable (that we refer to in this paper as
locally unobservable). This differs with SIU where the agents
measure directly the unknown (vector) parameter and so, in
the absence of attacks, are (locally) observable.
B. Main Results: Strong Consistency of SAGE
We present our main results on the performance of SAGE.
The first result establishes the almost sure convergence of
the SAGE algorithm (under a condition on the measurement
streams under attack) and specifies its rate of convergence.
Recall that A is the set of compromised measurement streams.
Theorem 1 (SAGE Strong Consistency). Let A ={
p1, . . . , p|A|
}
, HA =
[
hp1 · · · hp|A|
]ᵀ
, and N =
P \ A. If the matrix
GN =
∑
p∈N
hph
ᵀ
p , (13)
satisfies
λmin (GN ) > ∆A, (14)
where
∆A = max
v∈R|A|,‖v‖∞≤1
‖HᵀAv‖2 , (15)
then, for all n, we have
P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ0 ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖2 = 0
)
= 1, (16)
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
.
We are interested in determining the attacks against which
SAGE is resilient. Theorem 1 provides a sufficient condition
for the attacks on the measurements under which SAGE
ensures strong consistency of all local estimates.4 Due to
heterogeneous measurements, this resilience condition (14) is
different from the resilience condition in [5] (which assumed
homogeneous measurements). This is necessary because, het-
erogeneous measurements provide different information about
θ∗ (e.g., when each measurement stream provides information
about a single component of θ∗), so the resilience of SAGE
depends on which measurement streams are compromised.
This condition depends on GN (13), the observability Gram-
mian of the noncompromised measurements, and ∆A (15),
which captures the maximum disturbance caused by the
compromised measurements. The minmum eigenvalue of GN ,
λmin (GN ) captures the redundancy of the noncompromised
measurement streams in measuring θ∗. For example, consider
the case where all measurement vectors hp are canonical
basis vectors, so that each scalar measurement stream provides
information about one component of θ∗. Then, there are at
least λmin (GN ) scalar streams measuring each component
of θ∗.
Intuitively, the resilience condition (14) states that there
needs to be enough redundancy in the noncompromised mea-
surements N to overcome the effects of any attack on the
4The ceiling at 1
2
on the rate of convergence τ0 in Theorem 1 comes as a
result of the measurement noise. This is the fastest rate at which the norm of
the averaged measurement noise converges to 0. This ceiling is not present
in [5] because it assumed noiseless measurements.
measurement streams in A. Condition (14) is sufficient, but it
is not always necessary for consistent estimation. As we will
demonstrate through numerical examples, in some cases (i.e.,
for certain sets of compromised measurements A), SAGE still
guarantees strongly consistent local estimates even if (14) is
not satisfied.
The optimization problem in (15) is nonconvex (since it
is a constrained maximization of a convex function). As a
consequence of Assumption 2, which states that ‖hp‖2 = 1,
we have |A| ≥ ∆A. Then, a sufficient condition for (14) is
λmin (GN ) > |A| . (17)
The condition in (17) describes the total number of compro-
mised measurement streams that are tolerable under SAGE,
and we are interested in comparing this number against
theoretical limits established in [25] for centralized (cloud)
estimators.
Specifically, Theorem 3.2 in [25] states that, in the absence
of measurement noise, a centralized estimator may tolerate
attacks on any s measurement streams and still consistently
recover the value of the parameter if and only if the set of all
measurement streams is 2s-sparse observable. By tolerating
attacks on any s measurement streams, we mean that, no
matter which s measurement streams are under attack, and no
matter how the attacker maniuplates those measurements, the
estimator still produces consistent estimates. If an estimator
is not resilient to attacks on s measurements, it means that
there is a specific set of s measurements, and a specific
way in which they are manipulated, such that the resulting
estimate is not consistent. If the attacker compromises a
different set of s measurements, or changes the way the
measurements are manipulated, the estimator may still produce
consistent estimates. We again emphasize that the resilience
condition (17) is a sufficient condition; under certain attacks,
even if (17) is not satisfied, SAGE still produces consistently
local estimates.
The following result relates the (relaxed) resilience condi-
tion (17) to sparse observability.
Theorem 2. If λmin (GN ) > |A| for all |A| ≤ s, then, the
set of all measurement streams P = {1, . . . , P} is globally
2s-sparse observable. Now, let
V =
⋃
p∈P
{hp} , (18)
be the set of all unique measurement vectors hp. If V is
orthogonal, then λmin (GN ) > |A| only if P is 2s-sparse
observable.
In general, 2s-sparse observability is a necessary condition for
SAGE to tolerate attacks on any s sensors. If the set of all
unique measurement vectors hp is orthogonal, then, 2s-sparse
observability is also sufficient.
The scenario where V , the set of all unique measurement
vectors, is orthogonal arises when we are interested in esti-
mating a high dimensional field parameter. For example, in
air pollution monitoring, each component of the parameter
θ∗, which may be high dimensional, represents the pollutant
concentration at a particular location. Each individual device
8is only able to measure concentrations of nearby locations. In
this case, the rows hᵀp of the measurement matrix Hn are the
canonical basis (row) vectors, where each device measures
a subset of the components of θ∗. Recall that agents are
interested in estimating the entire parameter θ∗. When the
measurement vectors hp are canonical basis vectors, the local
measurements at each agent provide information about some,
but not all, components of θ∗. In order to estimate all of
the components of θ∗ when the measurements are not locally
observable, the agents must exchange information with their
neighbors.
For analyzing the resilience condition λmin (GN ) > |A|,
another case of interest is when θ∗ is a scalar parameter.
When θ∗ is a scalar parameter, each (uncompromised) agent’s
measurement stream is modeled by
yn(t) = θ
∗ + an(t). (19)
For the measurement model (19), the resilience condition
λmin (GN ) > |A| becomes |A|P < 12 . To ensure that SAGE pro-
duces strongly consistent local estimates of scalar parameters,
it is sufficient to have a majority of the measurement streams
remain uncompromised. For the scalar parameter and mea-
surement model (19), the condition |A|P <
1
2 is also necessary.
If a majority of the measurement streams are compromised,
then, the adversary may force the local estimates to converge
to any arbitrary value. This is because the adversary may
compromise measurement streams arbitrarily; an(t) may take
any (i.e., unbounded) value in (5). The condition |A|P <
1
2 is
also necessary for resilient centralized estimation [25].
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
This section proves Theorem 1, which states that, under
SAGE, all local estimates are strongly consistent as long as the
resilience condition (14) is satisfied (λmin (GN ) > ∆A). The
proof of Theorem 1 requires several intermediate results that
are found in the Appendix. The proof of Theorem 1 has two
main components: we separately show that, in the presence of
measurement attacks, the local estimates xn(t) converge a.s. to
the mean of all of the agents’ estimates (i.e., the agents reach
consensus on their local estimates), and that, under resilience
condition (14), the mean estimate converges a.s. to the true
value of the parameter. Unless otherwise stated, all inequalities
involving random variables hold a.s. (with probability 1).
A. Resilient Consensus
In this subsection, we show that the agents reach consensus.
Let
xt =
[
x1(t)
ᵀ · · · xN (t)ᵀ
]ᵀ
, (20)
yt =
[
y1(t)
ᵀ · · · yN (t)ᵀ
]ᵀ
, (21)
Kt = diag (k1(t), . . . , kP (t)) , (22)
DH = blkdiag (H1, . . . ,HN ) , (23)
xt =
1
N
(1ᵀN ⊗ IM )xt, (24)
x̂t = xt − (1N ⊗ IM )xt. (25)
The vectors xt,yt ∈ RNM collect the estimates and time-
averaged measurements, respectively, of all of the agents. The
matrix Kt ∈ RP×P is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal
elements are the saturating gains kp(t) for each measurement
stream. The variable xt ∈ RM is the network average estimate
(the mean of the agents’ local estimates) and x̂ ∈ RNM
collects the differences between the agents’ local estimate
xn(t) and the network average estimate xt.
Lemma 1. Under SAGE, x̂ satisfies
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ3 ‖x̂t‖2 = 0
)
= 1, (26)
for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2.
Lemma 1 states that, under SAGE, the agents’ local es-
timates converge a.s. to the network average estimate at a
polynomial rate. That is, the agents reach consensus on their
local estimates even in the presence of measurement attacks.
Under SAGE, the agents reaching consensus do not depend on
the number of compromised measurement streams: the result
in Lemma 1 holds even when all of the measurement streams
fall under attack, as long as the inter-agent communication
network is connected on average.
Proof of Lemma 1: From (8), we find that xt follows
the dynamics
xt+1 = (INM − βtLt ⊗ IM − αtDᵀHKtDH)xt+
αtD
ᵀ
HKtyt.
(27)
Then, from (27), we have that x̂t follows the dynamics
x̂t+1 = (INM − PNM − βtLt ⊗ IM ) x̂t+
αt (INM − PNM )DᵀHKt (yt −DHxt) ,
(28)
where
PNM =
1
N
(1N1N )
ᵀ ⊗ IM . (29)
From [28], we have that the eigenvalues of the matrix INM −
PNM − βtL ⊗ IM are 0 and 1 − λn (L), for n = 2, . . . , N ,
each repeated M times.
Taking the `2 norm of x̂t+1, we have
‖x̂t+1‖2≤‖(INM−βtLt⊗IM−PNM ) x̂t‖2 + αtγt
√
P , (30)
where we have used the following relations to derive (30)
from (28):
‖INM − PNM‖2 = 1, (31)
‖hp‖2 = 1, (32)
‖Kn(t) (yn(t)−Hnxn(t))‖∞ ≤ γt. (33)
Relation (31) follows from the definitions of INM and PNM ,
relation (32) follows from Assumption 2, and relation (33) fol-
lows from the definition of Kn(t) (equation (9)). By definition,
x̂t ∈ C⊥, where C ⊆ RNM is the consensus subspace
C = {w ∈ RNM |w = 1N ⊗ v, v ∈ RN} , (34)
and C⊥ is the orthogonal complement of C. Since x̂t ∈ C⊥,
we have PNM x̂ = 0. Lemma 7 in the appendix provides an
9upper bound for the first term on the right hand side of (30).
Specifically Lemma 7 states that, for t large enough, we have
‖(INM − βtLt ⊗ IM ) x̂t‖2 ≤ (1− r(t)) ‖x̂t‖2 , (35)
where r(t) is an Ft+1 adapted process that satisfies 0 ≤
r(t) ≤ 1 a.s. and E [r(t)|Ft] ≥ cr(t+1)τ2 for some cr > 0.
Substituting (35) into (30), we have
‖x̂t+1‖2 ≤ (1− r(t)) ‖x̂t‖2 + αtγt
√
P . (36)
Lemma 6 in the appendix studies the stability of the relation
in (36) and shows that (t + 1)τ3 ‖x̂‖2 converges a.s. to 0 for
every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2.
B. Network Average Behavior
This subsection characterizes the behavior of the network
average estimate xt. Specifically, we show that, under re-
silience condition (14), xt converges a.s. to the value of the
parameter θ∗. Define
et = xt − θ∗, (37)
k˜p(t) =
{
kp(t), if p ∈ N ,
0, otherwise, (38)
KNt = diag
(
k˜1(t), . . . , k˜p(t)
)
, (39)
KAt = Kt −KNt , (40)
wt =
[
w1(t)
ᵀ · · · wN (t)ᵀ
]ᵀ
. (41)
The term et in (37) is the network average estimation error.
Lemma 2. Define the auxiliary threshold
γt =
Γ
(t+ 1)τγ
− Y
(t+ 1)τ3
− W
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
, (42)
where
τ3 = τγ + τ1 − τ2 − Y (43)
for arbitrarily small
0 < Y < τ1 − τ2, 0 < W < 1
2
− τγ . (44)
If the resilence condition (14) is satisfied, then, almost surely,
there exists T0 ≥ 0, 0 < Y <∞, 0 < W <∞ such that,
1) ‖wt‖2 ≤ W
(t+1)
1
2
−W
a.s.,
2) ‖x̂t‖2 ≤ Y(t+1)τ3 a.s., and,
3) if, for some T1 ≥ T0, we have ‖eT1‖2 ≤ γT1 , then,‖et‖2 ≤ γt for all t ≥ T1 a.s.
Proof of Lemma 2: From (8), we find that et follows the
dynamics
et+1 =
IM − αt
N
∑
p∈N
kp(t)hph
ᵀ
p
 et−
αt
N
(1ᵀN ⊗ IM )DᵀHKNt (DH x̂t −wt) +
αt
N
(1ᵀN ⊗ IM )DᵀHKAt (yt −DHxt) .
(45)
Lemma 4 in the appendix characterizes the a.s. convergence
of the time-averaged noise wt and shows that
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0 ‖wt‖2 = 0
)
= 1, (46)
for every 0 ≤ δ0 < 12 . As a result of Lemma 1, we have
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ3 ‖x̂t‖2 = 0
)
= 1, (47)
for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2.
We now consider the evolution et along sample paths ω ∈ Ω
such that
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0 ‖wt,ω‖2 = 0, (48)
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ3 ‖x̂t,ω‖2 = 0. (49)
Note that the set of all such ω has probability measure 1. The
notation et,ω means the value of et along the sample path ω.
As a result of (48) and (49), there exists finite Yω and Wω
such that, with probability 1,
‖wt,ω‖2 ≤
Wω
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
, ‖x̂t,ω‖2 ≤
Yω
(t+ 1)τ3
. (50)
Suppose that, at time T1, ‖eT1,ω‖2 ≤ γT1,ω (where, in (42),
Y = Yω and W = Wω). We show that there exists finite T0
such that if T1 ≥ T0, then, for all t ≥ T1, ‖et,ω‖ ≤ γt,ω a.s.
Specifically, we show that, for sufficiently large T1, if
‖eT1,ω‖2 ≤ γT1,ω then, ‖eT1+1,ω‖2 ≤ γT1+1,ω . We show
that if ‖eT1,ω‖2 ≤ γT1,ω , then, kp(T1, ω) = 1 for all p ∈ N
(i.e., the magnitude of the innovations for noncompromised
measurements p are all below the threshold γt.) By the
triangle inequality, we have, for all p ∈ N ,∣∣∣y(p)n (T1, ω)− hᵀpxn(T1, ω)∣∣∣
≤ ∣∣hᵀp (θ∗ − xT1,ω + xT1,ω − xn(T1, ω))∣∣+
|wpn(T1, ω)| ,
(51)
≤ ‖eT1,ω‖2 + ‖x̂T1,ω‖2 + ‖wT1,ω‖2 , (52)
≤ γT1,ω +
Yω
(T1 + 1)τ3
+
Wω
(T1 + 1)
1
2−W
. (53)
By definition of γt, we have
γt,ω = γt −
Yω
(t+ 1)τ3
− Wω
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
, (54)
which means that∣∣∣y(p)n (T1, ω)− hᵀpxn(T1, ω)∣∣∣ ≤ γT1 ,∀p ∈ N . (55)
As a result of (55), we have kp(T1, ω) = 1 for all p ∈ N .
Using (45), we analyze the dynamics of |et‖2. From (45),
we have
‖et+1,ω‖2 ≤
∥∥∥∥∥∥IM − αtN
∑
p∈N
kp(t)hph
ᵀ
p
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
‖et,ω‖2 +
αt
|N |
N
(‖x̂t,ω‖2 + ‖wt,ω‖2)+ αt∆AN γt.
(56)
To derive (56), we use the fact that kp(t) ≤ 1 and
kp(t)
∣∣∣y(p)n (t)− hᵀp(t)xn(t)∣∣∣ ≤ γt for all p ∈ A and for
all t. Substituting (54) into (56), and using the fact that
kp(T1, ω) = 1 for all p ∈ N , we have
‖eT1+1,ω‖2 ≤
(
1− αT1κ
N
)
γT1,ω +
αT1PYω
N(T1 + 1)τ3
+
αT1PWω
N(T1 + 1)
1
2−W
,
(57)
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κ = λmin (G)−∆A. (58)
To derive (57), we also use the fact that, for T1 sufficiently
large, αT1λmin(GN )N ≤ 1 and∥∥∥∥∥∥IM − αT1N
∑
p∈N
hph
ᵀ
p
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= 1− αT1
N
λmin (GN ) . (59)
Equation (59) follows from the fact that, by definition, GN =∑
p∈N hph
ᵀ
p (equation (13)).
Using (57), we now find conditions on T1 such that
‖eT1+1,ω‖2 ≤ γT1+1,ω . Define
Γt,ω = Γ− Yω
(t+ 1)τ3−τγ
− Wω
(t+ 1)
1
2−W−τγ
. (60)
Note that γt,ω =
Γt,ω
(t+1)τγ , Γt,ω is increasing in t, and, for t
sufficiently large, Γt,ω > 0. Without loss of generality, let T˜ω
be defined such that, for all t ≥ T˜ω , (59) holds and Γt,ω > 0.
Since Γt,ω is increasing in t, we have
γt+1,ω ≥
Γt,ω
(t+ 2)τγ
=
(
t+ 1
t+ 2
)τγ
γt,ω. (61)
Thus, to find conditions on T1 such that
‖eT1+1,ω‖2 ≤ γT1+1,ω,
it is sufficient to find conditions on T1 such that
‖eT1+1,ω‖2 ≤
(
T1 + 1
T1 + 2
)τγ
γT1,ω. (62)
Since ‖eT1,ω‖2 ≤ γT1,ω , we may rearrange the right hand
side of (57) so that (62) becomes(
1− αT1ρT1,ω
N
)
γT1,ω ≤
(
T1 + 1
T1 + 2
)τγ
γT1,ω, (63)
where
ρT1,ω = κ−
PYω
ΓT1,ω(T1 + 1)
τ3−τγ −
PWω
ΓT1,ω(T1 + 1)
1
2−W−τγ
.
(64)
Note that
αT1ρT1,ω
N
≥ αT1
N
(
κ− c5
(T1 + 1)τ4−τγ
)
, (65)
where τ4 = min
(
τ3,
1
2 − W
)
and c5 =
P (Yω+Wω)
ΓT1,ω
. For
T1 ≥ max
(
T˜ω,
(c5
κ
) 1
τ4−τγ − 1
)
,
the right hand side of (65) is nonnegative, and, after substitu-
tion of (65), the condition in (63) becomes
1−
(
aκN−1
(T1 + 1)τ1
− ac5N
−1
(T1 + 1)τ1+τ4−τγ
)
≤
(
T1 + 1
T1 + 2
)τγ
, (66)
where we have used the fact that, by definition (equation (11)),
αT1 =
a
(T1+1)τ1
.
Since (1− x) ≤ e−x for x ≥ 0, (66) becomes
ac5(Nτγ)
−1
(T1 + 1)τ1+τ4−τγ
− aκ(Nτγ)
−1
(T1 + 1)τ1
≤ log
(
T1 + 1
T1 + 2
)
. (67)
Note that log
(
T1+1
T1+2
)
≥ 1 − T1+2T1+1 = − 1T1+1 , so a sufficient
condition for (67) is
ac5
(T1 + 1)τ1+τ4−τγ
− aκ
(T1 + 1)τ1
≤ −Nτγ
T1 + 1
. (68)
Let τ5 = min(τ1 + τ4 − τγ , 1). By definition, τ5 > τ1.
Then, (68) is satisfied for all T1 ≥
(
ac5+Nτγ
aκ
) 1
τ5−τ1 − 1.
Define
T0=max
(
T˜ω,
(c5
κ
) 1
τ4−τγ
,
(
ac5 +Nτγ
aκ
) 1
τ5−τ1
)
−1. (69)
If T1 ≥ T0 and ‖eT1,ω‖2 ≤ γT1,ω , then ‖eT1+1,ω‖2 ≤
γT1+1,ω . Since T1 + 1 ≥ T0, we then have ‖et,ω‖2 ≤ γt,ω
for all t ≥ T1. This analysis holds for almost all sample paths
ω, and Lemma 2 follows.
Lemma 2 states that, with probability 1, there exists some
finite time T0 such that, if the `2-norm of the network average
error at some time T1 ≥ T0 falls below γT1 , then, it will be
upper bounded by γt for all t ≥ T1. The auxiliary threshold
γt is defined in such a way that, if ‖et‖2 ≤ γt, then, with
probability 1, kp(t) = 1 for all p ∈ N . That is, if the
network average error has `2 norm less than the auxiliary
threshold γt, then, SAGE does not affect the contribution of
the uncompromised measurements in the agents’ local estimate
updates. We now use Lemma 2 above to show that the network
average estimate converges almost surely to θ∗.
Lemma 3. Under SAGE, if λmin (GN ) > ∆A, then
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ0 ‖et‖2 = 0
)
= 1, (70)
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
.
Proof of Lemma 3: We study the convergence of et along
sample paths ω ∈ Ω for which Lemma 2 holds (such a set of
sample paths has probabilty measure 1). Consider a specific
instantiation of ‖et,ω‖2. There exists finite T0 such that, if at
any time T1 ≥ T0, ‖eT1,ω‖2 ≤ γT1,ω , then, for all t ≤ T1,‖et,ω‖2 ≤ γt,ω . Consider t > T0. There are two possibilities:
either 1.) there exists T1 > T0 such that ‖eT1,ω‖2 ≤ γT1,ω ,
or 2.) for all t ≥ T0, ‖et,ω‖2 > γt,ω. If the first case occurs,
then, by Lemma 2, for t ≥ T1,
‖et,ω‖2 ≤
Γ
(t+ 1)τγ
, (71)
which means that limt→∞(t + 1)τ0 ‖et‖2 = 0 for every 0 ≤
τ0 < τγ .
If the second case occurs, then, define
K̂t,ω =
γt,ω +
Yω
(t+1)τ3 +
Wω
(t+1)
1
2
−W
‖et,ω‖2 + Yω(t+1)τ3 + Wω(t+1) 12−W
. (72)
Since ‖et,ω‖2 > γt,ω , K̂t,ω < 1. By definition, the numerator
in (72) is equal to γt. Recall that the sample ω is chosen from
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a set (of probabilty measure 1) on which Lemma 2 holds,
which means that there exists finite Yω and Wω that satisfy
‖x̂t,ω‖2 ≤ Yω(t+1)τ3 and ‖wt,ω‖2 ≤ Wω(t+1) 12−W . As a result,
the denominator in (72) satisfies
‖et,ω‖2+
Yω
(t+ 1)τ3
+
Wω
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
≥
∣∣∣y(p)n (t, ω)− x(p)n (t, ω)∣∣∣ ,
for all p ∈ N . Thus, we have
K̂t,ω < kp(t, ω), (73)
for all n ∈ N . Rearranging (72), we also have
γt = K̂t,ω
(
‖et,ω‖2 +
Yω
(t+ 1)τ3
+
Wω
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
)
. (74)
Substituting (73) and (74) into (56), we have
‖et+1,ω‖2 ≤
(
1− αt
N
K̂t,ωλmin (GN )
)
‖et,ω‖2 +
αt
|N |
N
(
Yω
(t+ 1)τ3
+
Wω
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
)
+ αt
∆A
N
γt,
(75)
=
(
1− αt
N
κK̂t,ω
)
‖et,ω‖2 +
αtP
N
(
Yω
(t+ 1)τ3
+
Wω
(t+ 1)
1
2−W
)
.
(76)
To derive (75) from (56), we have used the fact that, for t
large enough,∥∥∥∥∥∥1− αtN
∑
p∈N
kp(t, ω)hph
ᵀ
p
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥1− αt
N
K̂t,ωGN
∥∥∥
2
, (77)
since, by definition, GN =
∑
p∈N hph
ᵀ
p . From (76), we show
that (t+ 1)τγ K̂t,ω ≥ K̂ω for some K̂ω > 0. It suffices to
show that ‖et,ω‖ <∞. Note that there exists finite T such that
αT ≤ 1. Because such a finite T exists, to show ‖et,ω‖ <∞,
it then suffices to only consider t ≥ T (since, for t < T ,
‖et,ω‖2 <∞ by definition). From (72), we have
(t+ 1)τγ K̂t,ω ≥ Γ
supj∈[T,t] ‖ej,ω‖2 +Rω
, (78)
where Rω = Yω +Wω.
Define the system
mt+1 =
(
1− αt
N
κγt
mt +Rω
)
mt +
αtP
N
Rω
(t+ 1)τ6
,
mt+1 = max (mt+1,mt) ,
(79)
where τ6 = min
(
τ3,
1
2 − W
)
, with initial condition mT =
‖eT,ω‖2. By definition, mt ≥ supj∈[t,T ] ‖ej,ω‖2. Further,
from (44), we have τγ < τ6, since τγ < 12−W and τγ < τ3 =
τγ + τ1− τ25, so the system in (79) falls under the purview of
Lemma 8. As a result, we have supt≥T ‖et,ω‖2 < ∞. Since‖et,ω‖2 is bounded from above, we have that
K̂t,ω ≥ K̂ω
(t+ 1)τγ
, (80)
5By definition (11), τ1 > τ2.
for some K̂ω > 0. Substituting (80) into (76), we have
‖et+1,ω‖2 ≤
(
1− αtκK̂ω
N(t+ 1)τγ
)
‖et,ω‖2 +
αtRω
(t+ 1)τ6
. (81)
Lemma 5 in the appendix studies the convergence of the
systems in the form of (81). As a result, we have
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ0 ‖et,ω‖2 = 0, (82)
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < τ6 − τγ . By definition τ6 − τγ =
min
(
τ1 − τ2 − Y , 12 − W − τγ
)
. Taking Y , W arbitrarily
close to 0, combining (82) with (71) and using the fact
that τγ < τ1 − τ2, we have that (82) holds for every
0 ≤ τ0 < min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
. Moreover (82) holds for every
ω that satisfies Lemma 2, which yields (70).
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: We show that, for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, as long
as the resilience condition (14) (i.e., λmin (GN ) > ∆A) is
satisfied, we have
P
(
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
τ0 ‖xn(t)− θ∗‖2 = 0
)
= 1
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
. By the triangle
inequality, we have
‖xn(t)− θ∗‖2 ≤ ‖x̂t‖2 + ‖et‖2 . (83)
Lemma 1 states that
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ3 ‖x̂t‖ = 0
)
= 1, (84)
for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2. Lemma 3 states that
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
τ0 ‖et‖2 = 0
)
= 1, (85)
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
. Combining (83), (84),
and (85) yields the desired result.
V. RESILIENCE ANALYSIS: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2, which relates the
resilience condition λmin (GN ) > |A| to sparse observability.
Theorem 2 states that a necessary condition for SAGE to
tolerate attacks on any s measurement streams is global 2s-
sparse observability. In addition, if the set of all unique
measurement vectors hp is an orthogonal set, then global 2s-
sparse observability is sufficient for SAGE to tolerate attacks
on any s measurement streams.
Proof: First, we show that if λmin (GN ) > |A| for all
|A| ≤ s, then, the set of all measurement streams P is 2s-
sparse observable. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that
P is not 2s-sparse observable. Then, there exists a set X ⊆ P
with cardinality |X | = 2s such that GP\X = HᵀP\XHP\X is
not invertible. Partition X as X = A ∪ A′, where |A| = s,
|A′| = s, and A ∩A′ = ∅, and define N = P \ A. Note that
GN =
∑
p∈P\A
hph
ᵀ
p =
∑
P\X
hph
ᵀ
p +
∑
A′
hph
ᵀ
p (86)
= GP\X + GA′ , (87)
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The minimum eigenvalue of GN satisfies [37]
λmin (GN ) ≤ min
v∈RM , ‖v‖2=1
vᵀGN v. (88)
For any nonzero, unit norm v in the nullspace of GP\X , we
have
vᵀGN v ≤
∑
p∈A′
vᵀhphᵀpv ≤ |A′| , (89)
where the last inequality in (89) follows as a consequence of
the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality [37] hᵀpv ≤ ‖hp‖2 ‖v‖2 = 1.
From (88) and (89), we have that λmin (GN ) ≤ |A|, which
shows the contrapositive.
Second, we show that, under the condition that V , the set
of unique measurement vectors hp, is orthogonal, if P is 2s-
sparse observable, then, λmin (GN ) > |A| for all |A| ≤ s. We
resort to contradiction. Let V = {v1, . . . , v|V|}. If |V| < M ,
then, define v|V|+1, . . . , vM so that {v1, . . . , vM} forms an
orthonormal basis for RM . Suppose there exists A such that
|A| ≤ s and λmin (GN ) ≤ |A|. Define, for m = 1, . . .M ,
Nm = {p ∈ N|hp = vm} . (90)
Then, for any vm, m = 1, . . . ,M , we have
GN vm =
∑
p∈N
hph
ᵀ
pvm = |Nm| vm, (91)
since, by the orthogonality of V , we have hᵀpvm = 1 if
hp = vm and hᵀpvm = 0 if hp 6= vm. Equation (91)
states that the eigenvalues of GN are |N1| , . . . , |NM |. Let
m∗ = arg minm∈{1,...,M} |Nm| , and define X = A ∪ Nm∗ .
Since λmin (GN ) ≤ |A| ≤ s, we have |X | ≤ 2s. Then, we
calculate the minimum eigenvalue of GP\X as
λmin
(GP\X ) = λmin (GN\Nm∗ ) = 0. (92)
Equation (92) indicates that the set of all measurement streams
P is not 2s-sparse observable, which is a contradiction and
shows the desired result.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We demonstrate the performance of SAGE through two
numerical examples.
A. Homogeneous Measurements
In this first example, we consider a random geometric
network of N = 500 agents each making (homogeneous)
measurements of an unknown parameter θ∗ ∈ R2. The
parameter θ∗ may represent, for example, the location of a
target to be tracked. Each agent makes a local stream of
measurements yn(t) = θ∗ + wn(t), where the measurement
noise wn(t) is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with
mean 0 and covariance σ2I2. According to (17), SAGE is
resilient to attacks on any set of 250 measurement streams.
In this example, we consider four levels of local signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR): -7 dB, -13 dB, -19 dB, and -25 dB.
Note that, at these SNRs, even in the absence of attack,
the noise at each local device is much stronger than the
measured signal. We place agents uniformly at random on
a two dimensional grid, and agents may communicate with
Fig. 1: A random geometric network of N = 500 agents.
nearby agents whose Euclidean distance is below a certain
threshold. Figure 1 depicts the network setup for the first
numerical example. Communication links may fail at random.
In each iteration, each communication link fails (indepen-
dently) with probability 0.1 (i.e., 10% chance of failure in
each iteration). An adversary compromises the measurement
streams of 100 of the agents, chosen uniformly at random.
In this example, the agents under attack have measurement
streams yan(t) = −3θ∗ + wn(t). 6
It is important to correctly choose αt = a(t+1)τ1 , βt =
b
(t+1)τ2 , and γt =
Γ
(t+1)τγ . The weight selection proce-
dure (equations (11) and (12)) only require a, b,Γ > 0,
0 < τ2 < τ1 ≤ 1, and τγ < min
(
1
2 , τ1 − τ2
)
. We use
the following guidelines for selecting these weights in our
numerical simulations. We choose
a = 1, b =
1
λN (L)
,
where L is the Laplacian of the fixed graph shown in Figure 1
(with no failing links). The effect of choosing different Γ on
the performance of SAGE also depends on the true value of
θ∗ and the adversary’s actions an(t). Since we do not know
these values, instead of providing a rule for choosing Γ, we
show, for fixed θ∗ and an(t), the effect of choosing different
Γ on the estimator’s performance. For the decay rates τ1, τ2,
and τγ , we choose
τ1 = 0.26, τ2 = 0.001, τγ = 0.25.
We now explain our guidelines. From (56), we see that the
evolution of ‖et‖2 depends on
∥∥∥IM − αtN ∑p∈N kp(t)hphᵀp∥∥∥
2
.
If we choose a = 1, then, we guarantee that∥∥∥∥∥∥IM − αtN
∑
p∈N
kp(t)hph
ᵀ
p
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1,
for all t, which ensures, at each time step, a contractive effect
on the evolution of ‖et‖2. Similarly, from (30), we see that the
evolution of ‖x̂t‖2 depends on ‖INM−βtLt⊗IM−PNM‖2 .
6Although we use a fixed attack an(t) in this simulation, recall that, in
general, the attack an(t) may be unbounded and time varying.
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If we consider the fixed graph Laplacian L and choose b =
1
λN (L)
, then, we guarantee that
‖INM−βtLt⊗IM−PNM‖2 ≤ 1,
for all t, which ensures, at each time step, a contractive effect
on the evolution of ‖x̂‖2. For choosing the decay rates, note
that, in Theorem 1, the local estimates’ convergence rate is
upper bounded by min
(
τγ ,
1
2 − τγ
)
. We maximize this upper
bound by selecting τγ = 0.25. To promote fast resilient
consensus, we select a small decay rate for the consensus
weight (τ2 = 0.001). Finally, we choose τ1 to be large enough
(τ1 = 0.26) to satisfy τγ < τ1 − τ2. Choosing τ1 to be too
large causes the innovation weight αt to decay rapidly, which
may slow down the convergence of the algorithm.
The agents follow SAGE with the following weights: a =
1, τ1 = 0.26, b = 0.0337, τ2 = 0.001,Γ = 5, τγ = 0.25. We
compare the performance of SAGE against the performance of
the baseline consensus+innovations estimator [28], [29] with
the same weights a, τ1, b, τ2.
Fig. 2: Maximum over all agents of the local estimation root
mean square error (RMSE) for SAGE (left) and baseline consen-
sus+innovations (right).
Figures 2 shows the evolution of the maximum of the local
root mean squared error (RMSE) (across all agents) over
iterations of SAGE and the baseline consensus+innovations
estimator. We report the average of the maximum RMSE over
500 trials. In the presence of adversaries, under SAGE, the
local RMSE decreases with increasing number of iterations,
while, under baseline consensus+innovations, there is a persis-
tent local RMSE that does not decrease. Figure 2 shows that,
under SAGE, higher local SNR yields lower RMSE.
Fig. 3: Maximum local RMSE after 1000 iterations versus Γ.
Figure 3 shows the effect of choosing different Γ on the
maximum local RMSE (across all aents) after 1000 iterations
of SAGE. If we choose Γ to be too small (e.g., at −7 dB SNR,
if Γ < 10−0.8), then, the thresholding is too aggressive, and
we limit the contributions of noncompromised measurements
to the estimate update. As we increase Γ, SAGE incorporates
more information from the noncompromised measurements,
resulting in lower RMSE. If we increase Γ too much, however,
SAGE becomes less effective at limiting the impact of the
attacks, which results in higher RMSE. The “optimal” choice
of Γ (the choice of Γ that provides the lowest RMSE in
Figure 3) depends on the value of the parameter θ∗ and the
attack an(t), which we do not know a priori.
The performance of SAGE also depends on the number
of compromised measurement streams. Figure 4 describes the
Fig. 4: Maximum local estimation RMSE versus number of SAGE
iterations (left). Maximum local RMSE after 1000 iterations versus
number of agents with compromised measurements (right).
relationship between the number of agents with compromised
measurements and the maximum local RMSE (at a local SNR
of −13 dB). We report the average maximum RMSE over
500 trials, where in each trial, the adversary attacks a new set
of agents chosen uniformly at random. Figure 4 shows that,
for a fixed number of iterations of SAGE, the local RMSE
increases as the number of agents under attack increases.7 We
fit the exponential curve
RMSE1000 = 1.756× e0.00855|A|,
with R2 = 0.9603, to describe the relationship between the
number of compromised measurements |A| and the RMSE
after 1000 iterations of SAGE.
B. Heterogeneous Measurements
In the second example, we demonstrate the performance of
SAGE with heterogeneous measurement models. The physical
motivation for the example is as follows. We consider the
network of N = 100 robots placed in a two dimensional
environment modeled by a 100 unit × 100 unit grid (see
Figure 5). Similar to the first example, the communication
links in the network fail at random. In each iteration, each
link fails independently with probability 0.1. Each square of
the grid has an associated [0, 255]-valued safety score, which
represents the state of that particular location. For example, a
safety score of 0 may mean that there is an inpassable obstacle
at a particular location, while a safety score of safety score
of 255 may represent a location that is completely free of
obstacles. The unknown parameter θ∗ ∈ [0, 255]10,000 is the
collection of safety scores over the entire environment. Each
component of θ∗ is the safety score at a single grid location.
7When there is no measurement noise and the parameter is guarnteed to be
bounded (i.e., ‖θ∗‖ ≤ η for some η > 0), reference [5] provides an analytical
description of the relationship between the number of agents under attack and
the local RMSE.
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We represent the true value of θ∗ an image (the image of the
baboon in Figure 5), where each pixel value represents the
score of a grid location.
Fig. 5: (Left) A network of N = 100 robots. An adversary
compromises the measurement streams of 10 robots (shown as red
diamonds). (Right) The true value of θ∗, where each pixel value of
the image represents the safety score at that particular grid location.
The agents’ goal is to recover the entire image from their
local measurements. Each agent measures the local pixel
values in a 45 pixel by 45 pixel grid centered at its own
location. The measurement of agent n is
yn(t) =
 h
ᵀ
Pn+1
...
hPn+Pn

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hn
θ∗ + wn(t),
where each measurement vector hp is a canonical basis vector.
In this example, the Hn matrices are chosen to emphasize
local measurements. The measurement matrix Hn “selects”
in this simulation the components of θ∗ corresponding to all
grid locations within a 45 pixel by 45 pixel subgrid centered
at the location of agent n. The measurement noise wn(t) is
i.i.d. N (0, 100IPn) . The dimension Pn of the measurement
yn(t) depends on the location of the agent n. Agents in
the center of the grid environment measure the states of
Pn = 45× 45 = 2025 grid locations, while agents toward the
edge of the environment have smaller Pn (for example, agents
in the corner of the environment have Pn = 22× 22 = 484).
An adversary attacks 10 agents and compromises all of their
measurement streams: all compromised measurement streams
p ∈ A take value y(p)n (t) = 255. In total, there are P = 93, 025
measurement streams, and the adversary attacks 10 agents
and compromises |A| = 16, 082 measurement streams.8 It is
impractical to explicitly detect and identify each compromised
measurement stream in this scenario, due to the combinatorial
cost.
According to (17) and Theorem 2, SAGE is guaranteed to
be resilient to attacks on any 4 measurement streams, which
is the same as the most resilient centralized estimator. That is,
there exists a specific set of 5 measurement streams, which,
if compromised, prevents SAGE (and any other estimator)
from consistently estimating θ∗. Even though there exists a
specific set of 5 (or more) compromised measurement streams
prevent SAGE from producing consistent estimates, in this
simulation, we show that SAGE may still produce consistent
8The set A is the set of compromised measurement streams, not the set of
compromised agents.
estimates even the number of compromised measurements
vastly exceeds four (|A| = 16, 082 4).
We use the same guidelines as in the first example to
select the weights for SAGE: a = 1, τ1 = 0.26, b =
0.0494, τ2 = 0.001,Γ = 100, τγ = 0.25. We compare the
performance of SAGE against the performance of the baseline
consensus+innovations estimator.
Fig. 6: Maximum over all agents of the local estimation root mean
square error (RMSE) for SAGE and baseline consensus+innovations.
Fig. 7: Comparison the estimation result after 800 iterations of SAGE
(left) and baseline consensus+innovations (right).
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the maximum local
RMSE (over all agents) for SAGE and the baseline con-
sensus+innovations estimator. We report the average of the
maximum RMSE over 500 trials. Under the measurement
attacks, SAGE produces estimates with decreasing RMSE
(with increasing number of iterations), while the baseline con-
sensus+innovations estimator has a persistent local RMSE that
does not decrease. Figure 7 compares the estimation results
of SAGE and the baseline consensus+innovations estimator,
after 800 iterations of each algorithm. We reconstruct each
pixel of the image using the worst estimate across all agents.
Figure 7 shows that, under SAGE, all of the agents resiliently
recover the image even when there are measurement attacks. In
contrast, under the baseline consensus+innovations estimator,
measurement attacks prevent the agents from consistently
estimating θ∗.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied resilient distributed estimation
under measurement attacks. A network of IoT devices makes
heterogeneous, linear, successive noisy measurements of an
unknown parameter θ∗ and cooperates over a sparse commu-
nication network to sequentially process their measurements
and estimate the value of θ∗. An adversary attacks a subset
of the measurements and manipulates their values arbitrarily.
This paper presented SAGE, the Saturating Adaptive Gain
Estimator, a recursive, consensus+innovations estimator that
is resilient to measurement attacks.
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Under SAGE, each device applies an adaptive gain to its
innovation (the difference between its observed and predicted
measurements) to ensure that the magnitude of the scaled
each innovation component is below time-varying, decaying
threshold. This adaptive gain limits the impact of compromised
measurements. As long as the number of compromised mea-
surements is below a particular bound, then, we demonstrate
that, for any on-average connected topology, SAGE guarantees
the strong consistency of all of the (compromised and uncom-
promised) devices’ local estimates. When each measurement
stream collects data about a single component of θ∗, SAGE
achieves the same level of resilience (in terms of number
of tolerable compromised measurement streams) as the most
resilient centralized estimator. For example, this could occur in
air quality monitoring, when devices measure local pollutant
concentrations corresponding to inidivudal components of the
unknown parameter. Finally, we illustrated the performance
of SAGE through numerical examples. Future work includes
designing resilient estimators for dynamic (time-varying) pa-
rameters and dealing with measurement attacks that roam over
the network.
APPENDIX
The proof of Theorem 1 requires several intermediate re-
sults. The following result from [11] characterizes the behavior
of time-averaged measurement noise.
Lemma 4 (Lemma 5 in [11]). Let v1, v2, v3, . . . be i.i.d.
random variables with mean E [vt] = 0 and finite covari-
ance E [vtvᵀt ] = Σ. Define the time-averaged mean vt =
1
t+1
∑t
j=0 vt. Then, we have
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0 ‖vt‖2 = 0
)
= 1, (93)
for all 0 ≤ δ0 < 12 .
We will need to study the convergence properties of scalar,
time-varying dynamical systems of the form:
wt+1 = (1− r1(t))wt + r2(t), (94)
where
r1(t) =
c1
(t+ 1)δ1
, r2(t) =
c2
(t+ 1)δ2
, (95)
c1, c2 > 0, and 0 < δ1 < δ2 < 1. The following Lemma
from [28] describes the convergence rate of the system in (94).
Lemma 5 (Lemma 5 in [28]). The system in (94) satisfies
lim
t→∞ (t+ 1)
δ0 wt+1 = 0, (96)
for every 0 ≤ δ0 < δ2 − δ1.
We will also need the convergence properties of the system
in (94) when the r1(t) is random.
Lemma 6 (Lemma 4.2 in [31]). Let {wt} be an Ft-adapted
process satisfying (94), i.e., wt+1 = (1− r1(t))wt + r2(t),
where {r1(t)} is an Ft+1-adapted process such that, for all
t, 0 ≤ r1(t) ≤ 1 a.s. and
c1
(t+ 1)δ1
≤ E [r1(t)|Ft] ≤ 1, (97)
with c1 > 0, 0 ≤ δ1 < 1. Let r2 = c2(t+1)δ2 with c2 > 0 and
δ1 < δ2 < 1. Then, we have
P
(
lim
t→∞(t+ 1)
δ0wt = 0
)
= 1, (98)
for every 0 ≤ δ0 < δ2 − δ1.
To account for the effect of random, time-varying Lapla-
cians, we use the following result from [31].
Lemma 7 (Lemma 4.4 in [31]). Let C ⊆ RNM be the
consensus subspace, defined as
C = {w ∈ RNM |w = 1N ⊗ v, v ∈ RN} , (99)
and let C⊥ be the orthogonal complement of C. Let {wt} be
an Ft-adapted process such that wt ∈ C⊥. Also, let {Lt}
be an i.i.d. sequence of Laplacian matrices that is Ft+1-
adapted, independent of Ft, and satisfies λ2 (E [Lt]) > 0.
Then, there exists a measurable Ft+1-adapted process {r(t)}
and a constant cr > 0 such that 0 ≤ r(t) ≤ 1 a.s. and
‖(INM − βtLt ⊗ IM )wt‖2 ≤ (1− r(t)) ‖wt‖2 , (100)
with
E [r(t)|Ft] ≥ cr
(t+ 1)τ2
, (101)
for all sufficiently large t. The terms βt and τ2 are defined
according to (11).
We will also need to analyze scalar, time-varying dynamical
systems of the form:
m̂t+1 =
(
1− r1(t)
(mt + c3)
)
mt + r2(t),
mt+1 = max (|m̂t+1| , |mt|) ,
(102)
with initial condition m0 ≥ 0, where r1(t) and r2(t) are given
by (95), and c3 > 0.
Lemma 8. The system in (102) satisfies
sup
t≥0
mt <∞. (103)
Proof of Lemma 8: First, we show that there exists
finite T such that mT+1 = mT and r1(T ) < 1. We
separately consider the cases of T = 0 and T > 0. If
m1 = m0 and r1(0) < 1, then the condition is satisfied for
T = 0. Otherwise, by construction, mt is a non-negative, non-
decreasing sequence. Since r1(t) decreases in t, for T large
enough, we have r1(T ) < 1 and
(
1− r1(T )mT+c3
)
≥ 0, which
means that |m̂T+1| = m̂T+1. Further, this means that, for
T large enough, a sufficient condition for mT+1 = mT is
mT ≥ m̂T+1. Computing mT − m̂T+1, we have
mT − m̂T+1 = c1mT
(T + 1)δ1 (mT + c3)
− c2
(T + 1)δ2
. (104)
The term mTmT+c3 is increasing in mT . Since mT is a nonde-
creasing sequence, we have
mT
mT + c3
≥ m1
m1 + c3
> 0 (105)
for all T > 0. To derive (105) from (104), we have used the
fact that m1 > 0, which is guaranteed by (102).
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Then, letting c4 = m1m1+c3 , substituting into (104), and
performing algebraic manipulations, a sufficient condition for
mt ≥ m̂T+1 is
T ≥
(
c2
c1c4
) 1
δ2−δ1 − 1, (106)
which shows that there exists finite T such that mT+1 = mT .
Second, we show that mt = mT for all t ≥ T . If t ≥ T ,
then t also satisifies the sufficient condition in (106), which
means that mT = mT+1 = mT+2 = . . . . Finally, we have
supt≥0mt = mT <∞.
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